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Abstract
This paper introduces heterogeneity of cross-technologies interactions into the
double-differentiated R&D-based endogenous growth model. In this model new
technologies appear continuously and older are outdated generating structural change.
All technologies may interact with each other through knowledge spillovers which
are technology-specific and this results in innovations’ heterogeneity. The conditions
on the shape of these interactions for the existence of the (sustained) growth path
in the decentralized economy as well as for the social planner’s problem are estab-
lished. Next the necessity for government interventions depending on the complexity
of these interactions is studied. At last the scale and duration of interventions are
demonstrated to be functions of spectral properties of the interactions operator.
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1 Introduction
The process of large-scale technical change involves not only the emergence of new tech-
nologies and refinement of existing ones, but also the structural change of the economy
whereas some older technologies and sectors are replaced by newer ones. This is the case
with renewable energy transition being actively pursued by many European economies
and the modernization of developing economies where traditional sectors are gradually
replaced by the more technologically-intensive ones.
Once such a structural change is of an issue it is important not only to understand
the drivers of this change, but also the impact of the changing structure of knowledge
spillovers being experienced by the R&D sector. Existing growth models fall short of
capturing both these issues. First, majority of the growth literature assume a rather
simplistic structure of knowledge spillover. In particular, the intensity of spillovers is
assumed to be uniform across technologies, even if dependent on the existing number of
technologies, as in Peretto and Connolly (2007),Acemoglu et al. (2012) among others.
The recent exceptions are Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Chu et al. (2017) where firms’
heterogeneity is allowed for but this is not attributed to the structure of R&D spillovers
as a whole.
Second, the exit of outdated technologies is rarely accounted for and the range of
technologies is either stabilizing in the long-run, resulting in the vertical innovations being
the primary growth driver as in Peretto and Connolly (2007), or the range of sectors grow
in an unlimited way, as in Chu et al. (2012). In recent Hamano and Zanetti (2017)
endogenous process of firms’ entry and exit is modelled, but continuous structural change
is not the growth driver there.
In this paper, we advance and study a model of cross-technology interactions that is
more general than existing models regarding possible interdependencies of technological
developments and allows for almost any type of pairwise cross-technologies dependencies.
At the same time to model the large-scale technological transition we make use of the
endogenous growth model of structural change, Bondarev and Greiner (2017) whereas new
technologies arrive continuously and older ones are scrapped due to competitive pressure
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and limited resources available. The paper thus combines this novel endogenous structural
change framework with heterogeneity of knowledge spillovers.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the general properties of such a
heterogeneous spillovers are studied. It is shown under which conditions the underlying
economy would possess balanced growth paths in decentralized and centralized cases. It
turns out that for market economy those conditions are very restrictive, whereas for a
social planner they are more relaxed.
Second we find out that the first-best solution for the economy is not always feasible
even without liquidity constraints for the government. Conditions for the feasibility of
the first-best structural change are established based on the spectral properties of cross-
technologies interactions.
At last the characterization of the size and duration of regulation necessary to grant
dynamic consistency ot such an economy in technological transition are obtained.
In the next section, the model is described. Section 3 contains main results of the
paper. In particular I establish the balanced growth path existnece conditions (Subsec.
3.1), show how and why the decentralized solution and a social planner’s solution diverge
(Subsec. 3.2), and when the government intervention suffices to restore the balanced
growth path (Subsec. 3.3). Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The framework is based on the endogenous structural change model with symmetric
technologies, described in Bondarev and Greiner (2017), where the reader is referred to
for details. Here only essential model ingredients are described to make exposition self-
contained. The main novelty of the suggested model lies in the introduction of a fairly
general way of the heterogeneity of technologies through the cross-technologies interac-
tions operator, similar to Bondarev and Krysiak (2017) where only partial equilibrium
setting is considered.
3
2.1 Households
Households are modelled in a standard way. The amount of labour is constant and
distributed across the range of final sectors, which are in existence:
L =
Nmax(t)∫
Nmin(t)
L(i, t)di,
Nmin(t) < Nmax(t) < N(t), (1)
where:
• L is the total labour in the economy (equal to population),
• L(i) is the employment in sector i,
• N(t) is the number of products or technologies (range) invented up to time t,
• Nmax(t) is the range of manufacturing sectors with positive operating profit (any
new technology does not immediately yield positive productivity),
• Nmin(t) is the range of sectors, which have disappeared from the economy up to
time t.
The objective functional of the household (lifetime utility) is
JH =
∞∫
0
e−ρtU(C)dt, (2)
with U(C) = lnC being the utility function from composite consumption C consisting of
the continuum of products,
C =
[∫ Nmax
Nmin
C
ε−1
ε
i di
] ε
ε−1
, (3)
with 1 < ε <∞ being the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The flow budget constraint of the household is
a˙ = ra+ L−
∫ Nmax
Nmin
PiCidi− Ta, (4)
with L the numeraire so that the wage rate is equal to one and where:
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• a is the value of assets being hold by the households
• r is the interest rate
• T is the income tax rate (time-varying or not)
We assume zero depreciation rate of capital for simplicity. Positive depreciation will not
essentially change the results of the paper. We denote consumption expenditures by E:
E =
∫ Nmax
Nmin
PiCidi , (5)
along the same range of existing sectors to condense notation.
Consumption of the individual good i is given by
Ci = E
P−εi∫ Nmax
Nmin
P 1−εj dj
. (6)
The standard Euler equation implies that the optimal growth rate for expenditure is
given by
E˙
E
= (r − T )− ρ , (7)
2.2 Goods Producers
Goods producers employ labour and buy technology from the R&D sector. With these
inputs they produce the goods which they sell to the consumer. Output of good i is given
by:
Yi = A
α
i Li , (8)
where 0 < α < 1 determines the productivity of the technology in production. The
productivity Ai is the result of vertical innovations that raise the quality of a given
technology and that are generated by the R&D sector.
The profit of firm i is
Πi = PiYi − Li −Ψ , (9)
where Ψ is a fixed operating cost.1
1check whether we need them; seems nmax equals n without them, why then?
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The only use for output of all goods i is consumption, so that Ci = Yi. The only
product used for investments is financial capital a which is excluded from this spectrum.
Firm i, therefore, sets its price to
Pi =
ε
ε− 1A
−α
i . (10)
This is the price defined only for the products in the range Nmax − Nmin. All products
out of the range Nmax −Nmin have a price of zero:
Pi =

0, t < τmax(i), τmax(i) : Πi = 0, Π˙i > 0,
ε
ε−1A
−α
i , τmax(i) < t ≤ τmin(i), τmin(i) : Πi = 0, Π˙i < 0,
0, t > τmin(i).
(11)
Here and throughout the paper we use the following notation:
• τmin = N−1min(i), time when product (technology) i becomes out-dated and profit of
manufacturing decreases below zero;
• τmax = N−1max(i), time when product (technology) i becomes profitable and manu-
facturing sector starts production of positive amounts;
• τ0 = N−1(i), time when technology i is invented through horizontal innovations
process.
Inserting (6) and (10) into (8) yields labour demand as,
LDi =
− 1

E
A
−α(1−)
i
Nmax∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
j dj
. (12)
Labour employed in sector i is thus a function of the relative productivity of labour
in sector i. Repeating the arguments made with respect to the price formation, we get a
piecewise-defined labour demand:
LD(i) =

0, t < τmax(i), τmax(i) : Πi = 0, Π˙i > 0,
−1

E
A
−α(1−)
i
Nmax∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
j dj
, τmax(i) < t ≤ τmin(i), τmin(i) : Πi = 0, Π˙i < 0,
0, t > τmin(i).
(13)
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The technology is acquired by the goods producers in the form of a patent and the
pricing for this patent follows Nordhaus (1967), Romer (1990) and Grimaud and Rouge
(2004). The price of the patent (blueprint) equals the total value of profits which can be
derived from it. The manufacturing firm can extract positive profits only for a limited
period of time. Thus the patent price is defined as:
pA(i)
def
=
τmin∫
τmax
e−r(t−τ0)Πidt. (14)
The date at which patent i starts, τmax, is endogenously determined by the productivity
threshold necessary to gain positive profits, while the effective duration of the patent is
endogenously determined from the demand for the manufactured product i, by the point
in time, τmin, when the final producer can no longer earn positive profits. Thus, the
duration of the patent is determined by two zero-profits conditions.
Further, the patent price is independent of time. It only depends on the ratio of
productivity in sector i at time points τmax, τmin. This observation directly follows the
benchmark model.
2.3 R&D Sector
The R&D sector includes two dimensions: vertical and horizontal innovations. Both types
of R&D use household assets as the only input. Thus, the total sum of both kinds of R&D
investments at any time forms the demand for assets in the economy:
u(t) +
N(t)∫
Nmin(t)
g(i, t)di = aD(t) , (15)
where
• u(t) are horizontal innovations investments at time t;
• g(i, t) are vertical innovations investments at time t for technology i within the range
of invented and not out-dated technologies, [Nmin(t), N(t)];
• aD(t) is the total demand for assets.
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All new technologies may differ in their impact on the existing set of technologies.
Thus the heterogeneity of technologies stems from cross-technologies interactions, which
could be positive (spillovers) or negative (business-stealing effect among R&D firms).
Both types of investments are optimally set as strategies of associated firms in their
optimal control problems. First the problem of R&D investments in horizontal innovations
is described and then that of vertical innovations.
2.3.1 Horizontal innovations
The creation of new technologies (horizontal innovations) in general follows the setup of
Peretto and Connolly (2007) and closely of Bondarev and Greiner (2017). We assume
that new technologies appear due to knowledge creation mechanisms that are governed
by private initiatives of competitive R&D firms. New technologies are created through
R&D investments, u(t), chosen optimally by the firms2:
N˙ = u(t) , (16)
These are financed from the assets of the households a(t) and represent a part of the total
assets demand aD in (15).
The incentive for horizontal innovations is the potential profit from selling the technol-
ogy to manufacturing firms, detailed further in (21). Assume that the horizontal R&D firm
which invents technology i later develops it through vertical innovations. The two-step
sequential optimization is equivalent to the joint optimization in this setup, see Bondarev
(2016) for example. Thus, the value of horizontal R&D consists solely in expected future
profits from vertical innovations:
VN = max
u(•)
∞∫
0
e−rt
(
piR(i)|i=Nu(t)− 1
2
u2(t)
)
dt. (17)
2of course the horizontal dimension may include knowledge spillovers as in standard endogenous growth
models. This is assumed away to streamline the exposition.
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Here, the profit of developing the next technology i = N , piR(i)|i=N , equals the value of
vertical innovations into technology i, which is given by:
piR(i)|i=N = pA(N)− 1
2
τmin(N)∫
τ0(N)
e−r(t−τ0)g2(N, t)dt , (18)
with g(N, t) investments into the development of technology N during the phase when
technology i has non-zero productivity. The fact that the value of a horizontal innovation
depends only on the next technology is equivalent to the result of Chu (2011) on the
presence of an Arrow replacement effect : each new technology is owned by a separate
R&D firm.
Next observation concerns the free entry of R&D firms:
Lemma 1. Under the free entry of firms into R&D sector (no strategic behavior of in-
cumbents) the potential profit for each new technology is constant, piR(i) = const.
Proof. Free-entry implies that any firm may enter the horizontal innovations process at
any stage. If some technology i∗ has higher potential profit, the potential entrant would
wait until this technology would become available for research (N approaches this i∗). But
then all potential entrants would do the same for any technology with higher potential
profit. This implies in the limit all technologies would have the same potential profit.
This immediately implies that independently of the form of the cross-technologies
interactions the horizontal technologies expansion remains linear as in the benchmark
case:
Corollary 1. The horizontal expansion of technologies’ range has constant speed
N˙ = piR(N) = const (19)
Proof. Construction of HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for the problem (17) -
(16) yields optimal investments as a function of piR(N) and marginal expansion value
∂VN
∂N
. It then follows that once piR(N) = const via Lemma 1, the only value function
which satisfies this HJB equation is a constant one, implying ∂VN
∂N
= 0 and thus N˙ = u =
piR(N) = const.
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We then may define the resources available for vertical innovations in the same way
as for the benchmark model:
piR +
N(t)∫
Nmin(t)
g(i, t)di = aD(t);
G(t)
def
=
N(t)∫
Nmin(t)
g(i, t)di = a(t)− piR (20)
where G(t) denotes the financial resources available for vertical innovations at time t.
2.3.2 Vertical innovations
Productivity-improving innovations (vertical innovations) lead to a rise in efficiency of
technologies that have zero productivity upon their invention. This productivity can be
developed through specific investments for every product.
Profits in R&D results from sales of blueprints to manufacturing firms. These sales
come in the form of patents for each new technology i and all of the investments into the
development of each new technology (vertical innovations) are financed from this patent
payment. Costs of R&D are costs of development of the productivity through technology-
specific investments gi. These investments are financed from household assets a forming
part of assets demand aD in (15).
The profit associated with the development of technology i is given by:
piR(i) = pA(i)− 1
2
τmin∫
τ0
e−r(t−τ0)g2(i, t)dt, (21)
with investments going into the increase of productivity as long as the technology is
operational:
∀i ∈ [Nmin(t), N(t)] : A˙P (i, t) = gP (i, t)− AP (i, t) , (22)
where superscript P denotes individually optimal quantities (to distinguish them from
socially optimal ones).
We first observe that the productivity of any technology is zero before it is invented
and after it is not used in manufacturing:
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Lemma 2. For all non-operational technologies the individually optimal productivity in-
vestments are zero
∀i /∈ [Nmin(t), N(t)] : gP (i, t) = 0 (23)
Proof. As soon as i > N(t) the technology is not yet invented and thus there is no asso-
ciated manufacturing sector demand for it. Thus profit incentive is zero and investments
are zero. Once i < Nmin(t) the manufacturing sector associated with technology i does
no longer generate positive profit and again investment incentives are zero.
Apart from individual investments there exist externalities experienced by each R&D
firm from all other existing R&D firms. This impact is described by the interactions
operator Θ such that:
A˙SP (i, t) = ΘA(j, t)
def
=
∫ N(t)
Nmin(t)
Θ(i, j)A(j, t)dj (24)
so any technology is subject to potential impact of those technologies present at t. The
cross-technologies interactions are state-dependent and their intensity is given by the in-
teractions operator Θ with Θ(i, j) measuring the impact of technology j on technology
i. This operator then is a natural generalization of the commonly employed knowledge
spillover, which acts as a main growth driver in the majority of endogenous growth liter-
ature (see Peretto and Smulders (2002) for discussion of knowledge spillovers).
However the general operator like (24) is difficult to analyze, since it might be the
case that already outdated technologies would experience a revival due to new spillovers
from emerging technologies. We thus impose the simplifying assumption on the structure
of cross-technologies interactions to make sure this is impossible in the model:
Assumption 1. For any technology i the range of technologies influencing it is limited:
∀i ∈ [0,∞) : Θ(i, j) =
θ(i, j), if Nmin(τ0(i)) ≤ j ≤ N(τmin(i)),0, otherwise (25)
Here N(τmin(i)) denotes the newest invented technology at the time technology i
becomes outdated (τmin(i)) and Nmin(τ0(i)) denotes the oldest technology at the time
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technology invented (τ0(i)). Assumption 25 thus requires that those technologies, which
appear after i is outdated, cannot influence it and those, which are already outdated when
i is just invented cannot impact it too. In this way the introduced assumption seems to
be not very much binding.
In fact this is the statement that spillovers are sufficiently local : there is a limit on
the range of technologies which is influenced by any given technology.
This assumption makes the operator Θ time-invariant: the overall impact on any
technology varies over time because of state-dependency, but the operator of these impacts
is fixed for any i. We thus may proceed as in Bondarev and Krysiak (2017) with analysis of
cross-technologies interactions3. The total evolution of productivity for every (invented)
technology i ∈ [Nmin, N ] is thus a sum of controlled individual investments and the
externalities impact:
A˙T (i, t) = A˙P (i, t) +
∫ N(τmin(i))
Nmin(τ0(i))
θ(i, j)A(j, t)dj (26)
where we use Assumption 1 replacing A˙SP (i, t) with a simpler bounded domain operator.
Observe that once j > N(t) the productivity for technology j is zero by the Lemma
2, and thus in an effect the spillover operator takes into account only already invented
technologies.
We next assume that in the decentralized economy individual R&D firms cannot track
the individual impacts of different technologies on each other (non-atomicity assumption):
Assumption 2. For any R&D firm i the impact of cross-technologies interactions is a
function of time only, independent of the state of any individual technology:∫ N(τmin(i))
Nmin(τ0(i))
θ(i, j)A(j, t)dj
def
= Θ(i, t) :
∂Θ(i, t)
∂A(j, t)
= 0 (27)
Using this assumption we can set up the R&D firm problem as a standard optimal
control problem in finite time (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1999) for example) and apply
3it is of interest to account for interactions operators with unbounded dynamic range (non-local ones),
that is, relaxing Assumption 1. However this rises substantial technical difficulties and involve non-local
operators theory, which is still under development, see e. g. Bernardis et al. (2016).
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the Maximum Principle. As a result we obtain optimal investments and productivity
evolution for each i as:
gP (i) =

∂pA(i)/∂Ai
1+r
(1− e(1+r)(t−τmin(i))), if τmin(i) ≥ t ≥ τ0(i),
0, otherwise
(28)
A˙P (i, t) =

∂pA(i)/∂Ai
1+r
(1− e(1+r)(t−τmin(i)))− AP (i, t) + Θ(i, t), if τmin(i) ≥ t ≥ τ0(i),
−AP (i, t) + Θ(i, t), if t > τmin(i),
0, if t < τ0(i)
(29)
with Θ(i, t) defined by (27) and ∂pA(i)/∂Ai being the marginal return to the increase in
productivity of i in terms of the patent price. Observe that this last is time-invariant
(since the patent price itself is time-invariant) for each i, but varies across i. So for
mathematical derivations this quantity may be treated as constant in time.
Given this observation the evolution of each technology, (29) is a linear non-autonomous
differential equation within operational phase τmin(i) ≤ t ≤ τ0(i). Once t > τmin(i) pro-
ductivity investments are zero, but the spillover part may still affect the productivity
evolution. By Assumption 1 the spillover affecting outdated technologies is limited: after
τmin(N(τmin(i))) (which is the time when the last invented during the development of i
technology becomes outdated) it is strictly zero and the technology decays to zero as in
the baseline model. During the period t ∈ [τmin(i), τmin(N(τmin(i)))] the manufacturing
firm may still use the technology as it may remain competitive even in the absence of R&D
investments. This type of producers we refer to as imitators as their behavior resembles
one in Acemoglu and Cao (2015).
So every technology potentially exhibits up to three phases of dynamics:
1. Normal R&D development till τmin(i) when productivity is supported by the asso-
ciated R&D firm receiving patent payments;
2. Free-rider development may start at any time after τmin(i) and continues at max
till τmin(N(τmin(i))) but can stop earlier;
3. Irreversible decay of technology after τmin(N(τmin(i)))
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The second phase is novel and appears due to the presence of cross-technologies interac-
tions Θ in the model. Depending on the structure of these interactions this phase may
have different duration and the development of technology may even exceed that during
the normal phase.
These firms would stay operational for some positive time as soon as the accumulated
profit during this spillover phase is non-negative. However, this will increase the compe-
tition at the labor market. We thus assume throughout the main part of the paper that
spillovers intensity is bounded in some precise sense:
Definition 1. Technology i is normal, if intensity of spillovers it experiences is not high
enough for potential free-riders to make positive profit:∫ τ(N(τmin(i)))
τmin(i)
er(t−τmin(i))Πidt ≤ 0 (30)
Otherwise technology i is free-riding.
We thus assume
Assumption 3. Operator Θ is such that all technologies are normal in the sense of
Definition 1.
It follows that once we adopt Assumption 3, every technology has only one operational
cycle which corresponds to the time when investments are positive4.
2.4 Government
As soon as there exist externalities across R&D, characterized by the operator Θ, there
might be a need for government interventions. To account for this opportunity we include
a government into the model, thus diverging from the benchmark case.
The government is caring only for market failures corrections, thus social planners’
problem is to maximize welfare coming from R&D only:
JG = max
g(•),u(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∫ N
Nmin
e−ρ(t−τ0(i))
{
b(i)− 1
2
g2(i, t)
}
di− 1
2
u2(t)
}
dt (31)
4again it would be of interest to allow for free-riding technologies, but this may lead to chaotic and even
non-deterministic dynamics because of piecewise-smooth system resulting from (29), see e. g. Colombo
and Jeffrey (2011) for details.
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with b(i) being the social value of the technology i. The focus of this paper is the market
inefficiency stemming from cross-technologies interactions so I make a simplifying assump-
tion concerning the social value of technologies, letting ∀i ∈ [0,∞) : b(i) = piR(i). All the
main results would hold for b(i) 6= piR(i) under suitable assumptions on this social welfare
wedge (like boundedness) but will unnecessarily overcomplicate the exposition.
The objective (31) together with constraints (15), (26), (16) defines the optimization
problem for the government which would yield a first-best schedule of technologies’ de-
velopment. Next, once this is different from the market solution, government would need
subsidies (positive or negative) to different technologies. If this would be the case, we
require government to run a balanced budget5:
∀t ∈ [0,∞) : S(t) def=
∫ N
Nmin
{s(i, t)di+ s(N(t), t)} dt = T (t)a(t) (32)
where S(t) is defined to be a total sum of subsidies (positive or negative), T (t) is the
income tax rate levied on households’ assets6. Once S(t) 6= 0 the government optimization
problem has to take (32) into account.
The social planner’s solution differs from the decentralized one exactly by the impact
of each technology on all others. Formally the social planner’s problem is maximizing (31)
subject to (16) and (22). This constitutes an infinite-dimensional infinite-horizon optimal
control problem. As soon as τ0,min,max(i) are taken as given the problem is equivalent to
the one considered in Bondarev (2015). Using Maximum Principle as of Skritek et al.
(2014), we may derive socially-optimal horizontal and vertical investments. The time
of emergence and profitability of technologies are then obtained as inverse functions of
5we neglect the possibility of deficit-run budget for the sake of simplicity, but again this would not
influence the main results of the paper
6it has been shown by Greiner and Bondarev (2015) that consumption tax actively discussed recently
may cause instability of the taxed economy so we limit exposition to the income tax only
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variety expansion:
g∗(i, t) = ψ∗(i, t) = ψR(i, t) +
1
1 + r
(1− e(1+r)(t−τ∗min(i)))
∫ Nmax
Nmin
Θ(j, i)ψ∗(j, t)dj,
A˙∗(i, t)) = ψ∗(i, t)− A∗(i, t) +
∫ Nmax
Nmin
Θ(i, j)A∗(j, t)dj,
u∗(t) = λ∗(t),
N˙∗(t) = N˙∗min(t) = N˙
∗
max(t) = λ
∗(t),
τ ∗0 (i) = (N
∗(t)|N=i)−1, τ ∗min(i) = (N∗min(t)|N=i)−1, τ ∗max(i) = (N∗max(t)|N=i)−1 (33)
In (33) we used the fact that outdating and operational phase entering of technologies
are proportional to the emergence of new ones (otherwise the economy would collapse in
finite time) and once b(i) = piR(i) the variety expansion is still linear. Then we get
Lemma 3 (Timing lemma).
Under the assumption b(i) = piR(i) and free entry the timing for all new technologies
coincide under social planner’s and market solutions:
∀i ∈ [N0,∞) : τ ∗0 (i) = τP0 (i), τ ∗min(i) = τPmin(i), τ ∗max(i) = τPmax(i). (34)
This provides consistency for government policy.
Proof. Once free entry holds, we get piR(i) = C. Then under social planner’s regime we
still get constant returns to every technology. This grants linear expansion rate and thus
equal timing for both economies.
This lemma is necessary to implement policies, since otherwise the mass of technologies
in operational phase/in existence would not coincide and any policy instrument targeted
at more than a single technology would be ill-posed.
Once Lemma 3 holds it is immediate to design the first-best subsidies schedule:
Lemma 4. The first-best subsidy to R&D is given by
s(i, t) :=
1
1 + r
(1− e(1+r)(t−τ∗min(i)))
∫ Nmax
Nmin
Θ(j, i)ψ∗(j, t)dj (35)
It is feasible as long as Θ is a compact operator and (32) holds.
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Proof. Comparing decentralised and centralised solutions (29) and (33) we observe that
investments differ solely by the term 1
1+r
(1−e(1+r)(t−τ∗min(i))) ∫ Nmax
Nmin
Θ(j, i)ψ∗(j, t)dj. It thus
suffices to assign a subsidy at this level to each technology to correct the decentralised
solution to the first-best one.
This subsidy is well-defined for each i only if the associated integral equation (Fredholm
equation) ψ∗(i, t) = ∂pA(i)/∂Ai
1+r
(1−e(1+r)(t−τmin(i)))+ 1
1+r
(1−e(1+r)(t−τ∗min(i))) ∫ Nmax
Nmin
Θ(j, i)ψ∗(j, t)dj
has a solution. This is the case as long as Θ is a compact operator and ψ∗(i, t) is defined
for each i.
At last, the budget constraint has to hold for the subsidy to be feasible, i. e. there
are sufficient funds to cover all additional expenditures.
Lemma 4 states that first-best subsidy schedule exists, but the requirement of com-
pactness is rather strong, since the operator changes its value every time new technology
arrives. In the absence of structural change this is almost always the case, since Θ be-
comes time-invariant. However under structural change as it is understood in this paper,
first.best subsidies are not always feasible, as the following analysis demonstrates.
To complete the description of the model we list market clearing conditions, which are
exactly the same as in the benchmark model.
2.5 Markets clearing
First, observe that E˙ = 0, since prices are moving in the opposite direction of productivi-
ties, total labor force is constant and labor income is a numeraire. Then the expenditures
are a cosntant fraction of the labor income:
E =

− 1L (36)
implying more or less that the labor income is consumed depending on  value (for  > 2
some capital income is consumed, for 2 >  > 1 fraction of labor income is saved).
Next, using E˙ = 0 and the Euler equation, we can derive the interest rate in equilib-
rium:
E˙
E
= r − T − ρ = 0→ r = T + ρ. (37)
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For the real interest rate to be constant, taxes should be constant in time also, implying
the requirement of government dynamic consistency.
Labour market clearing condition is given if the following holds:
N∫
Nmin
LD(i, t)di = L = L
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
i
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
j dj
di,
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
i
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
j dj
di =
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
i di
N∫
Nmin
A
−α(1−)
j dj
= 1. (38)
But this last condition is automatically satisfied, hence the labour market is cleared.
At last assets are growing in the economy once the initial endowment is sufficiently
high and taxes are low enough:
a˙ = (r − T )a− 1
− 1L, (39)
which can be solved to obtain the assets as a function of time,
a(t) = e(r−T )t
(
a0 − 1
(− 1)(r − T )L
)
+
1
(r − T )(− 1)L. (40)
Assets accumulation is positive as long as the initial assets of households are sufficiently
large:
a0 >
1
− 1
1
r
L. (41)
As long as (41) holds, assets increase exponentially. Since horizontal investments are
constant implying at most linear growth of assets demand from the horizontal R&D we
have under assumption of horizontal R&D having the priority7
Lemma 5. As long as (41) holds, T < r, then
∃!τsuff : ∀t > τsuff : G(t) > 0, (42)
Proof. Follows from the fact that a(t) grows exponentially and N(t) linearly. There exists
at most one intersection point of two monotonically growing functions of such types.
Denote it τsuff and the result follows.
7if on the contrary, vertical R&D are prioritized, there is no structural change and the economy follows
the setup of Peretto and Connolly (2007) with productivity growth only.
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3 Results
In this section we analyze the model described above. First the long-run behavior of
both decentralized and socially optimal economies are described and then we discuss the
necessity, scale and duration of interventions.
3.1 The BGP existence conditions
We first briefly state results similar for benchmark and heterogeneous cases without proofs
and then add some new insights appearing due to the spillover operator Θ.
Proposition 1. The productivity of the oldest operational sector, ANmin, is equal to the
productivity of the newest operational sector, ANmax, at the time when the first is leaving
the economy and the latter is entering its operational phase:
ANmin =
(Ψ/L)(− 1) Nmax∫
Nmin
A
α(−1)
j dj
1/α(−1) = ANmax . (43)
At the same time, the productivity of each sector grows within its operational phase,
Ai(τmin(i)) > Ai(τmax(i)). (44)
Proof. This follows from the zero profit condition defining the operational phase for any
i.
Since profit is zero on both ends of the operational phase and it is nonnegative in
between it follows that
Lemma 6. For any technology i exists at least one point τ¯(i) such that the profit of the
manufacturing sector is at maximum and it holds
Π˙(i) = 0⇔
A˙(i, t)
A(i, t)
−
Nmax∫
Nmin
A˙(j, t)
A(j, t)
dj
 = Ψ
αL
(N˙max − N˙min). (45)
Proof. By mean value theorem, see any analysis textbook, as Stromberg (1981).
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By Lemma 6 there are exactly two options for (45) to hold: either both sides simulta-
neously equal zero (which is the case for the baseline symmetric model) or generically,
∀i ∈ [0,∞] : ∃τ¯(i) : gA(i)(τ¯(i))− g¯A(τ¯(i))O˙(τ¯(i)) =
Ψ
αL
(46)
where we denote gA(i)
def
= A˙(i,t)
A(i,t)
the growth rate of productivity for technology i, g¯A
def
=
Nmax∫
Nmin
A˙(j,t)
A(j,t)
dj the average growth rate of productivities and O˙ def= N˙max − N˙min the shift
describing the change in the size of the economy.
We call the technology, which reaches at t maximum profit the leading technology. We
infer the following observation from (46):
Corollary 2. As soon as the growth rate of the leading technology is below average, the
economy shrinks in size and vice versa.
Proof. Indeed, since Ψ
αL
is always positive, it follows that once the numerator of the
righthandside in (46) is negative, the denominator is negative too, implying N˙max(τ¯(i)) <
N˙min(τ¯(i)). This means the economy shrinks in size. With above average growth rate the
opposite holds.
It then follows that the output growth rate in the heterogeneous economy includes
additional element defined by the Corollary 2 and can be non-monotonic and vary in
sign:
Corollary 3. The output growth may be positive or negative in the economy with hetero-
geneous spillovers and is given by:
gY
def
=
Y˙
Y
= αg¯A(Nmax −Nmin) + Ψ
αL
(N˙max − N˙min) R 0 (47)
Proof. Follows the same lines as in the baseline model for positive growth except that
condition N˙max = N˙min does not always hold. It then follows that once economy shrinks,
growth may be negative.
In particular, if the growth rate is positive together with the core expansion O˙ > 0,
such type of growth is not sustainable: as long as the expansion happens long enough as
20
for tE : Nmax(t
E) − Nmin(tE) → ∞ to realize, the growth becomes undefined, since the
economy would consist of the infinitely many infinitely small sectors with infinitely low
productivity.
On the other hand, if the second term is negative, implying core of the economy
shrinks, this type of growth, even with positive growth rates, is also unsustainable in the
long-run: as soon as for tS : Nmax(t
S) − Nmin(tS) = 0 new sectors become outdated at
the very same moment they become operational. Then the long-term growth rate is zero,
since Nmax ≥ Nmin cannot be violated by definition of these quantities.
We thus specify what we mean by the balanced growth path (BGP) making use of
this discussion:
Definition 2. The BGP of the economy described in Section 2 is the path along which
two conditions hold:
1. The output growth rate is positive and constant
∀t ∈ [t0,∞) : gY ≥ 0, g˙Y = 0 (48)
2. The economy’s size stays positive and finite:
∀t ∈ [t0,∞) : 0 < O(t) <∞ (49)
The first condition (48) is the standard one, implying the economy grows in the long
run. It does not require all the variables to grow at the same rate, but only the out-
put, since assets and productivity would then automatically follow some balanced growth
pattern (see e. g. Barbier (1999) for close definition of BGP).
The second condition is novel and reflects the importance of structural change: as
soon as the number of technologies becoming operational exceeds the number of becoming
outdated on a regular basis, the size of Nmax −Nmin = O grows without bounds and the
growth becomes unsustainable. One may speak of the over-diversification of the economy:
there are too many different technologies/sectors so the limited labour force is not enough
to keep them running. At the same time, if the opposite happens, Nmax = Nmin, there
is only one technology present in manufacturing at any time and it varies continuously,
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making it impossible to invest into the rise of productivity. In this case although vertical
R&D takes place rising the productivity of new technologies, these technologies cannot
stay operational long enough to provide positive profits for manufacturers and thus a
stimulus for further inventions. This is the situation of overburning : the structural change
intensifies so much, that older technologies are scrapped faster, then the economy may
compensate them with newer ones.
We thus see than the only usual BGP in this economy is exactly the one described by
the benchmark model with constant size of the core, O˙ = 0. Still, this may happen only
in a very special case as the following Proposition 2 shows.
It uses the operator spectral theory to some extent, so for exposition to be self-
contained I list here some additional definitions.
Definition 3. The spectrum of Θ, denoted σ(Θ) is the set of λ such that for any x
σ(Θ) = {λ : λx = Θx}.
The spectral radius of operator Θ, denoted ρ(Θ) is the maximal absolute size of its
spectrum
ρ(Θ)
def
= max{|λ|}. (50)
In particular for spillover operators defined over the Hilbert space we have σ(Θ) =
σp ∪ σc ∪ σr where subscripts p, c, r denote pointwise, continuous and residual spectral
components respectively and ρ(Θ) = ||Θ||op, spectral radius equals the operator norm of
Θ which is its maximal value (see e. g. Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999)).
Definition 4. The operator Θ is scalar, if ∀i 6= j : θ(i, j) = 0 and ∀i : θ(i, i) = θ > 0,
i. e. it is a scalar multiple of the identity operator.
This definition simply resembles that of a scalar matrix but for possibly infinite-
dimensional setting.
Definition 5. The operator Θ is of scalar type, if it admits the resolution of identity
similar to the multiplication operator.
We thus call Θ scalar-type if it resembles either the infinite-dimensional diagonal
matrix, or by proper choice of the eigenbasis may be transformed into such a diagonal
matrix (multiplication operator).
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Definition 6. The operator Θ is nilpotent if ∃n ∈ N : Θn = 0. It is topological nilpotent
if σ(Θ) = 0.
Observe that these two notions coincide only for finite-dimensional operators.
At last we follow Dunford (1954) and define
Definition 7. The operator Θ is spectral, if it admits the canonical decomposition into
the scalar-type and nilpotent parts.
In what follows we assume:
Assumption 4. The spillover operator Θ is a spectral one.
We are now ready to characterize the BGP existence of the decentralized economy.
Proposition 2 (On BGP existence for decentralised economy with spillovers).
Assume Θ 6= 0 and all spillovers are non-negative, ∀{i, j} : θi,j ≥ 0. Then:
1. As long as Θ is a scalar operator, the decentralized economy always possesses a BGP
with constant growth rates. It is defined by the spillover size as
g¯θA =

θ − 1, if θ > 1;
1, if θ = 1;
r, if θ < 1.
(51)
2. As long as Θ is a scalar-type operator, the decentralised economy possesses a BGP
with constant growth rate independent of the spillover size g¯0A = r if ρ(Θ) ≤ 1 and
no BGP in the sense of Def. 2 otherwise;
3. If Θ is not a scalar-type operator, there is no BGP type Def. 2 in the decentralized
economy with heterogeneous spillovers.
Proof. see Appendix A.
Observe that Proposition 2 implies that even diagonal (multiplication) operators may
cause unbalanced growth: for this to be the case it suffices for at least some technologies
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to experience sufficiently strong spillovers (θ(i) > 1). In this case the growth rate of every
technology may converge to a constant, but the average rate will vary over time, causing
fluctuations in the output growth rate.
Next, we observe that for the social planner problem the BGP can be achieved in a
wider variety of situations than for the decentralized economy:
Proposition 3. The socially optimal R&D system (33) admits the balanced growth path
in a sense of Definition 2 as soon as either:
1. the operator Θ is of the scalar-type
2. Operator Θ is compact.
Otherwise no socially optimal BGP exists.
Proof. see Appendix B
We thus observe that the first best solution admits the BGP as a planned one in a
wider variety of cases than the decentralized economy. So the next natural question is how
much inefficiency is implied by the divergence of the market economy from the centralized
one.
At last define a weaker notion of sustained growth path:
Definition 8. The economy follows a sustained growth path if (49) holds, but not neces-
sarily (48).
It is immediate to observe that once the economy is on the sustainable growth path
(SGP), it might experience prolonged periods of negative and positive growth, but the
requirement (49) implies that long run growth stays positive and finite on average, so this
economy may sustain growth for infinite time.
3.2 Dynamic inefficiency
In this part of the paper the potential inefficiencies of both decentralized and centralized
economy are studied.
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3.2.1 Market inefficiency
Proposition 2 states that the decentralized economy admits the constant sustained growth
path only as long as spillovers operator Θ is scalar or of the scalar-type and has limited
size (spectral radius is small enough). Now observe that typically dynamic nature of
technologies’ spectrum implies that the spillovers’ structure changes continuously. We
thus need some additional machinery to tackle with this issue.
Consider Θ|t0 : restriction of the spillover operator to the (fixed) time instant t0. This
restriction is a standard operator over the space of technologies, independent of time and
thus it makes sense to define the compactness8 of this restriction:
Definition 9. Operator Θ is said to be t0-compact if its restriction to t0 is compact in all
existing at t0 technologies J |t0 := {i|Nmin(t0) ≤ i ≤ N(t0)}.
Operator Θ is said to be t0-scalar(-type) if its restriction to t0 is scalar(-type) in all
existing at t0 technologies J |t0.
Following Proposition 2 denote by F ⊆ R+ those time instances t when operator Θ is
t-scalar-type with small spectral radius or just scalar:
F def= {t : ρ(Θ(i, j)|t) ≤ 1} (52)
and by G ⊆ R+ those time instances when the operator does not admit t-scalar form.
Then it follows that at any time t the spillover may take one of two forms: either it
admits consistent decentralised solution or not.
Denote further by S the form of the spillover operator at t which admits dynamically
consistent market solution (e. g. scalar or scalar-type with spectral radius smaller then
1):
S
def
= Θ|t∈F (53)
Proposition 4 (Market failure).
For any t ∈ [0,∞) :
8The linear operator is compact if it maps bounded subsets of the domain into relatively compact
subsets of its range, see e. g. Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999).
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1. As long as ∀t ∈ F ⊆ [0,∞) : Θ|t∈F = S market solution grants sustained positive
long-run growth rates to the economy and no government intervention is needed.
2. As soon as ∃tS ∈ G ⊆ [0,∞) : Θ|t≥tS 6= S, market solution leads to the collapse
of the economy in finite time and government intervention is necessary for some
positive duration starting from tS onwards.
Proof. See Appendix C
Comment: The last property is widely known as the knife-edge property of endogenous
growth models: once finely tuned conditions are violated, the economy cannot return to
the balanced growth path. For discussion of these see e. g. Peretto and Valente (2015).
The main novelty of the Proposition 4 lies in its dynamic nature: market economy can be
efficient and sustainable for some time, but only until essentially cross-sectoral spillovers
would appear in the economy. Once this is the case, such cross-sectoral interactions have
to be dealt with. Moreover even when the technology causing initial spillover would be
scrapped, it is not the case that the distortion caused by it will immediately stop, since
there could be cascading persistent effects (for details see Subsec. 3.3).
From the other hand, Proposition 4 establishes the conditions for market interven-
tions. These need not to be constant or even continuous. Rather the government should
additionally intervene in a timely manner only at those time instances t ∈ G when homo-
geneity condition for technologies is violated. Such a result is possible only for a dynamic
range of technologies. Indeed, once we set N˙ = 0 the interactions operator Θ is fixed and
its current structure fully defines whether there is a need in the regulation or not. This
regulation is then permanently in place (although the scale of intervention may decrease
over time) and its efficiency fully resembles that of Bondarev and Krysiak (2017) where
the cross-technologies interactions are time-invariant.
3.2.2 Government inefficiency
We next tackle the question under which conditions the government regulation may help
the economy to achieve the sustained growth path. Observe that the Definition 8 does
not imply the uniqueness of the SGP. On the contrary there might exist a lot of evolution
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paths of the economy which make the O operator positive and finite. I refer to the SGP
as the optimal if it yields maximal social welfare among possible SGPs. With this in mind
let us consider the dynamic efficiency of the government in achieving the optimal SGP.
Proposition 5 (Government efficiency).
For any t ∈ [0,∞) :
1. As long as t ∈ G, but Θt∈G is compact, government subsidies may implement the
first-best solution and sustained BGP is achieved;
2. As soon as Θt∈G is not compact, but its residual spectrum is null, the government
policy may help the economy to approach the optimal SGP with approximation error
increasing in the size of continuous spectrum of Θt∈G;
3. As soon as Θt∈G is not compact and its residual spectrum is non-empty, only the
economy-wide average subsidy is welfare improving, but the economy will not con-
verge to the optimal SGP.
Proof. see Appendix D
The Proposition 5 illustrates the fact that government has limited influence on the
economy: at some times it can improve upon the market failure and return the economy
on the BGP, but at other times it could be the case that any government intervention
cannot help to stabilize the economy and economy-wide crisis follows. Apparently this
would be the case when some fundamentally new technology appears (like those studied
in the literature on general purpose technologies (GPT), see Bresnahan (2010) for an
overview) which has impact on a broad range of dispersed sectors. This would be the
case 3. of the Proposition 5. If this new technology’s impact is limited and affects some
isolated group of industries, the case 2. realizes and the government may at least smooth
away part of this influence. In normal situation case 1. realizes, when new technologies
influence existing structure of the economy in a limited way9.
9compactness of the operator means it maps bounded sequences to bounded sequences, thus spillovers
are smoothly distributed and bounded
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In particular, both Propositions 4 and 5 pave the way to obtain non-monotonic growth
rates in the otherwise fully analytic endogenous growth model. It thus may be applied
to observed stylized facts concerning growth: it can be non-monotonic, growth rates
may diverge across countries, government interventions are necessary but not sufficient to
smooth away all fluctuations along the growth path.
3.3 Size and duration of regulation
We next ask the question on the duration of government intervention for a particular
externality caused by the new technology. We limit attention to spectral operators only
(see Def. 7), which is the fairly general class of operators for which the spectral theory is
well established. Spectral operator is by definition linear and bounded (hence continuous)
and admits the resolution of identity (see e. g. Dunford (1954)).
Any compact operator is spectral but not vice versa. The scalar-type operator is
the immediate infinite-dimensional extension of what is called semi-simple operator, that
is, the one without defective eigenvalues. The nilpotent part thus would contain all of
potential complexities of the operator.
To this end we first limit attention to the compact case, where we understand com-
pactness in the sense of Definition 9.
3.3.1 t-compact case
So assume for now economy is evolving in such a way that Θ is compact w. r. t. J |t for
all time t ∈ [0, t0]. Compact operators possess point-wise non-zero spectrum and zero as
a continuous spectrum, see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999) for details. Thus this situation
falls into case 1 of Proposition 5 and we may apply the property rights reform as defined
below.
Definition 10. The property rights reform in economy is given by canonical form of the
operator Θ. In particular, it assigns to each technology i all of its externalities according
to the spectrum of Θ
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In particular this is the restatement of the result that operator Θ has resolution of
identity and can be ’diagonalized’ in a sense that it is unitary similar to the multiplication
operator. The multiplication operator is an infinite-dimensional equivalent of a diagonal
matrix. Thus this reform just reassigns shares of different technologies in such a way
that newly defined entities do not have cross-technologies interactions, i. e. the spillover
operator is ’diagonal’.
This property rights reform obviously makes sense only for the operator with non-zero
pointwise spectrum, since otherwise it is not clear where to attribute some of externalities.
Once we consider compact operators, they all have only point-wise spectrum (except
zero) and thus we get full correspondence with the finite-dimensional Jordan-Chevalley
decomposition (JCD, see Helgason (2001) for example):
Lemma 7 (Infinite-dimensional JCD).
Any compact spectral operator over Hilbert space admits the canonical decomposition into
the semi-simple part and the nilpotent part.
Proof. Follows from definitions of the semi-simple, spectral and nilpotent operators and
from the canonical decomposition of the spectral operator in Dunford (1954).
Thus once we consider the case of compact operator government intervention always
have only two components:
1. Rearranging property rights via the spectral decomposition of Θ
2. Subsidies/taxes for technologies with Re(λi) > 1
3. Subsidies/taxes for the technologies which have spillovers entering the nilpotent part
of Θ
The first part is always possible once operator is compact and Lemma 7 holds. Indeed, for
any semi-simple operator in finite dimensions the Jordan canonical form (JCF, see Wein-
traub (2008) for example) is diagonal. Then for compact spectral infinite-dimensional
case we get equivalent as the resolution of identity with pointwise eigenvalues as a diago-
nal infinite-dimensional matrix. Moreover, the scalar-type part then exactly corresponds
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to the part of cross-technologies interactions which does not require any additional inter-
vention: the reformed operator is already a scalar one. So the only instability source left
is the possibly high impact of knowledge spillover, case 2 and the complexity impacts,
reflected by the nilpotent part.
Now the duration of these two types of intervention is different: the knowledge spillover
θ(i, i) has to be taken care of only within the operational phase of technology i. Indeed,
this is the spillover affecting only this given technology (after redefinition of property
rights) and thus once it becomes non-profitable there is no need in further regulation.
The nilpotent part, however, has to be regulated for a longer time: even once tech-
nology becomes outdated, its impact on other technologies persists through cascading
impacts. This cascades are long-term persistent effects which slowly deteriorate over
time. The duration of these post-effects is proportional to the number of technologies
being affected (size of affected cluster) and fully vanishes only once all the technologies in
this affected cluster are outdated. Denote, following Bondarev and Krysiak (2017), the
size of the nilpotent part by the number of eigenvalues entering it:
Definition 11. The t-complexity of the (t-compact) operator Θ is the number of eigen-
values with different algebraic and geometric multiplicities:
χ(Θ|t) =
K∑
i
(µa(λi − µg(λi))) (54)
Observe that this definition makes sense only for the operator with point-wise spectrum
(except zero), since for continuous and residual spectra notions of algebraic and geometric
multiplicities are not well-defined. Still as long as we are in the compact case the notion
of complexity is useful, as the following demonstrates
Proposition 6. Assume Θ|t is compact. Then:
1. As long as Θ|t is of scalar-type and ρ(Θ|t) ≤ 1 the government intervention for each
t consists solely of rearranging property rights via canonical decomposition of Θ;
2. As soon as Θ|t is of scalar-type but ρ(Θ|t) > 1 government regulation includes
additionally subsidies ∀i1 : λ(i1) > 1 size the impact for the duration τmin(i1)−τ0(i1);
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3. As soon as Θ|t contains non-zero nilpotent part and ∞ > χ(Θ|t) > 0, exactly χ(Θ|t)
additional cascading subsidies are necessary with the duration for each cluster being
∀k ∈ χ(Θ|t) : maxk τmin(ik)−maxk τ0(ik)
4. As soon as χ(Θ|t) → ∞ the regulation is permanent and continuous as long as
complexity stays infinite.
Proof. see Appendix E.
So we see that even in the best possible world of compact cross-technologies inter-
actions there are cases when the first-best outcome may be achieved only with the help
of continuous regulation. Still there are multiple instances where the time-limited and
technology-specific intervention is sufficient. Observe that not only the size (intensity) of
technological spillovers, but the structure (through the complexity measure) has crucial
importance for the size and duration of these interventions.
However the interactions operator needs not to be compact. For example, the emer-
gence of the drastic innovation (or GPT) would violate compactness assumption. We thus
study what can be done in the case of a non-compact operator Θ next.
3.3.2 Noncompact interactions
We now specify within the set G those time instances when Θ is t-compact and when it
is not. Denote
G1 := {t ∈ G} : σ(Θ|t) = σp(Θ|t),
G2 := {t ∈ G} : σ(Θ|t) = σp(Θ|t) ∪ σc(Θ|t),
G3 := {t ∈ G} : σr(Θ|t) 6= ∅,
G = G1 ∪ G2 ∪ G3, T := [0,∞) = G ∪ F (55)
where σp(Θ|t), σc(Θ|t), σr(Θ|t) denote point-wise, continuous and residual components of
the spectrum σ(Θ|t) respectively.
Once Θ|t is compact we apply Proposition 6 from above. Once it is not compact but
self-adjoint, it may possess continuous, but not the residual spectrum. In other words
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the operator Θ at t ∈ G2 remains the spectral operator, but is no longer compact. Thus
it admits the canonical decomposition into scalar-type and nilpotent parts, but not the
JCD-type decomposition, since some part of the spectrum is continuous.
In this case the new technology appearing at some tb ∈ G2 has substantial impact
on an open set of pre-existing sectors, so that the boundaries of this impact cannot
be determined precisely. The government regulation would include additional corrective
subsidies for a group of affected technologies up to a point when the technology generating
this spillover will become outdated (and thus t-compactness is restored). This additional
subsidy however cannot be finely tuned as to grant the first-best allocation, since it is
not clear to what extent the technologies in the affected group experience the externality.
Thus this additional subsidy is group-specific but uniform within the affected group. This
inefficiency comes into being because for the case of continuous spectrum the complexity
χ(Θ|t) is not well-defined: one could count the number of affected clusters, but not
the number of affected technologies within each cluster. The canonical decomposition
yields the sum of multiplication-similar operator (which is then subject to property rights
reform) and the nilpotent operator which contains all essentially complex interactions,
but they are not isolated as in the compact case.
At last, once at some tn ∈ G3 the new technology appears which is GPT-like and
affects the whole structure of the economy, the interactions operator exhibits residual
spectral component (i. e. is not self-adjoint and not compact). In this case there is no
government policy in the class of subsidies which would allow the economy to approach
the first-best BGP (since this does not exist at all).
4 Conclusion
In this paper the novel endogenous growth framework with dynamic structural change is
used to study the role of cross-technologies interactions. These interactions are represented
as a general infinite-dimensional matrix of pairwise technology interaction intensities.
The overall knowledge spillover experienced by a given technology is then a result of the
summing up individual impacts of all existing technologies weighted by intensity of the
32
influence and the level of development of those technologies themselves. Such a shape of
the spillover is fairly flexible and can capture the standard type of knowledge spillovers
studied previously in the literature (like Peretto and Smulders (2002)) but also new types
of spillovers. For example it allows for one-way (asymmetric) spillovers and heterogeneity
of interactions.
It turns out that the decentralized economy would possess a balanced growth path
exhibiting constant growth rates only for the very special type of knowledge spillover,
which is by no coincidence the only one previously studied. These are scalar interactions
describing equal spillover intensity for all the technologies dependent only of the technol-
ogy itself. In all other cases the market cannot provide the dynamically consistent way of
technological transition without government interventions. This result is independent of
the specific model at hand, since unequal spillovers lead to competitive advantage of some
of the technologies and the capital mobility ensures these are the only surviving technolo-
gies in the long run. On the other hand the first-best solution is dynamically consistent
in a wider variety of cases. Namely it suffices for cross-technologies interactions to form
a compact operator, i. e. all interactions are well defined on closed sets and are bounded
in size. If this is the case the socially optimal solution may be achieved through a set of
taxes/subsidies on the R&D eliminating those disbalancing competitive advantages.
In particular, two different regulation tools are suggested: the redefinition of property
rights such that every technology becomes separated and independent of all the others
and additional taxation of those sectors which grow faster then the average growth rate
of the economy.
The second contribution of the paper is the general characterization of those cases,
when not only the market but the social planner’s solution cannot grant the dynamical
efficiency to the economy. These are cases when the spillover operator is more complex
and includes spillovers affecting a significant range of technologies and those for which
the source cannot be identified precisely. In the latter case the balanced growth may be
at least approximated whereas in the former case there is no way to achieve the first-best
growth rates.
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At last the characterization of the size and duration of interventions has been carried
out. The time-varying economic policy impulses which depend on the spectral structure
of the spillover operator in a general way are introduced. The periods of qualitatively
different regulation are defined solely by the spectral structure of the spillover operator.
Despite their abstract nature, the results of this paper have immediate policy impli-
cations. First, it is crucial to take into account not only the intensity, but also the scope
and structure of knowledge spillovers and technologies’ interactions when designing the
R&D policy.
Second, if the economy is undergoing structural change such that older technologies
and sectors disappear and newer ones emerge (as is the case with large-scale clean energy
transition) the decentralized economy is unlikely to achieve the balanced growth without
government interventions. However some sustained growth may be achieved at least
temporarily, but the balanced growth cannot be restored automatically due to distortions
being brought into the system by the advance of newer technologies.
Third, the efficiency of government regulation of a large scale structural change de-
pends crucially on the scale of such changes and the scope of affected sectors. If only
isolated sectors/technologies are affected by new technologies, the conventional subsidiz-
ing policy would be efficient in restoring the equilibrium path of the economy. If significant
clusters of sectors are under impact of emerging technologies, the government may be able
to achieve the sustainable, but not the balanced growth and at last if the entire economy
is affected by some general purpose technology, the optimal path cannot be sustained
and (temporary) crisis is unavoidable. It thus seems that the large scale technical change
comes at the cost of temporary slowdown in economic performance.
There are still many directions in the suggested framework open for future research.
two of them are particularly intriguing. First, the impact of free-riding technologies may
turn the dynamics to be even more complicated and become unpredictable, justifying the
robust policy tools choice on the macroeconomic level. Second, the distribution of some
technologies spillovers may be unbounded (consider fire or electricity as examples) making
some spillovers non-local. Both these directions require far more complicated analytical
tools to study and are left for future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. As long as Θ is scalar in the sense of Definition 4 and its spectral radius is bounded
by 1, it means it represents the scalar multiple θ ≤ 1 and the spillover qualitatively does
not change the dynamics for the symmetric model. To see that just consider the symmetric
case where gP (i, t) = G(t)
N−Nmin following the baseline model and Θ(i, t) = θA(i, t). The
long-run growth rate g¯A is then independent of θ and equals r by direct computations.
This implies BGP exists as defined by Definition 2.
Once ρ(Θ) > 1, every technology has increasing growth due to spillover. However
the growth rate converges to the same value for any technology because of the turnpike
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property of the governing dynamical system in the same way as in the benchmark case
(see e. g. Yano (1984) for details). Direct computation shows that g¯A = θ − 1 in this
case.
Once Θ is not a scalar, it has some heterogeneity and under assumption θ(i, j) > 0
some technologies have competitive advantage and grow faster than others. Then either
the economy collapses into one-sector either it experiences explosive growth as follows
from Corollary 2. In both cases no BGP exists and sustained growth requires government
interventions.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. As soon as cross-technologies interactions are such that the spillover operator is
unitary similar to the multiplication one, it is always possible to redefine ’technologies’
in such a way, that they become separated and the R&D system (33) admits solution as
an infinite-dimensional ODE system. Since in the social optimum the shadow costs of
investments for every technology take into account all possible interactions, the resulting
solution is welfare- maximizing and as such admits the BGP.
On the other hand, once the operator is not necessarily of the scalar type, but is
compact, its spectrum contains only pointwise eigenvalues (discrete spectrum) and the
continuous spectrum is restricted to zero (see e. g. Kolmogorov and Fomin (1999)). Thus
even if the spillover operator contains the non-zero nilpotent part, this last has at most
countable non-zero entries which can be corrected for by appropriate subsidies/taxes (see
Bondarev and Krysiak (2017) for details).
Once the operator is not compact, the nilpotent part may contain continuous spectrum
components and usual regulation cannot correct for cascading cross-technologies spillovers.
Thus the first-best solution will eventually be unstable and the BGP as of Definition 2
would not exist.
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C Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For all t when Θ|t∈F = S, the BGP exists by Proposition 2. Since there are no
interactions between technologies not accounted for by individual R&D firms, the welfare
theorems grant the optimality of the decentralized solution.
As soon as Θ|t∈F 6= S, there exist at least some technologies with interactions not
accounted for by market participants. This leads to the non-balanced development of the
mass of technologies, whereas some are more efficient then others. Resources are thus
concentrated by the market in the most efficient ones, while other technologies start to
degrade. Even if at the next time instance it happens that t ∈ F , the distortion caused on
the previous step by the interactions is not smoothed out, since the competitive advantage
builds up. Then the economy will slip off the decentralized BGP and cannot return there
without government intervention. Thus as soon as t = tS as defined above, and operator’s
projection is no longer scalar(-type), the decentralized BGP is destroyed and cannot be
recovered without government intervention.
D Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. 1. Follows from Proposition 3: once Θ remains compact, the socially optimal
BGP exists and is feasible. Thus without further restrictions on subsidies it can be
implemented.
2. If Θ is not compact, the social BGP does not exist by Prop. 3. The spectral
decomposition implies that spectrum of Θ consists exactly of three parts: pointwise,
continuous and residual components. By assertion the residual component is empty,
thus only pointwise and continuous components have to be considered. Now observe
that (optimal) subsidy is proportional to the eigenvalues of Θ: indeed, these measure
the difference between social and private values of the spillover as in Bondarev and
Krysiak (2017). Still continuous spectrum components cannot be precisely defined
and only approximate eigenvalues may exist for this part of the spectrum (and
does not necessarily exist). Thus any government subsidy policy will differ from
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the potential optimal to the extent of the continuous spectrum. The sustained
growth path which is approximated is exactly the one with all the spillovers being
internalized and the proximity to it is then defined by the size of the continuous
component of the spectrum.
3. If the residual component of the spectrum is not empty, operator becomes not dense
in some part of its domain. This means there are sparse spillovers where the source
cannot be even approximated. Thus the optimal SGP cannot be approximated
either. Still by correcting for the overall effect of cross-technologies spillovers, the
government may achieve some SGP (not close to the optimal one) which is an
improvement over not following SGP at all (since positive welfare at infinite horizon
is always better then the finite-time collapse of the economy).
E Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. 1. Under this assertion the operator can be made similar to the multiplication
one (diagonal). Thus all the spillovers may be delineated through appropriate choice
of the basis (eigenbasis). At the same time all spillovers are inessential in a sense
that they do not grant crucial competitive advantage to the associated technology.
Thus the symmetry is fully restores by the proper rearrangement of property rights
(basis change).
2. Under this assertion the operator can be made diagonal but some technologies ex-
perience high positive spillovers which make then more efficient than others. For
each such a technology i1 the associated eigenvalue measures the intensity of its im-
pact and in the renormalized form of the spillover Θ this exactly corresponds to its
competitive advantage. Duration of a subsidy is then given by the time technology
stays operational.
3. If Θ contains non-zero nilpotent part, not all impacts may be reassigned through
property rights (the full diagonalization is not feasible). Still if the complexity is
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finite, it corresponds to finite cascades of technologies subject to the spillover and
thus given the ongoing structural change, the duration of the subsidy is still finite
and given by the timeframe of the cascade of technologies subjected by the impact.
4. At last if simultaneously nilpotent part is nonempty, and its complexity is infinite,
there are cascades of spillovers, which are not limited to certain range of technologies,
but are persistent. In this case the regulation has to be permanent.
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